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What is America? The world recoils when U.S. 
President Donald Trump says “America 
first,” but nothing should be more natural than a 
president putting his country first. The problem 
with “America first” is that for many people 
around the world, America is not just a country. 
The United States is a country. America is 
something more—not only the most powerful 
state, but the cultural, economic, and 
institutional center of a world that it has 
partially recreated in its own image. 
The West does not have a good word to describe 
America in this expanded sense because the 
modern West has never seen something like it 
before. The last time a whole world was so 
organized around a single, central state was in 
the fifteenth century, when East Asia 
was centered on Ming-dynasty China. China at 
the time wasn’t just the leader or regional 
hegemon; it was the central state of a political 
and cultural realm that stretched from Burma to 
Japan. And the word that came to describe this 
world was tianxia. 
Tianxia literally means “everything under the 
heavens,” but in the days of imperial China, it 
came to refer to “an enlightened realm” of 
“universal values that determined who was 
civilized and who was not,” in the words of the 
eminent historian Wang Gungwu. In the 
old tianxia, for instance, Chinese culture was 
the standard to which all others aspired, with 
the mastery of Chinese calligraphy serving as a 
sign of refinement everywhere in East Asia, even 
among people who didn’t speak Chinese. The 
Ming court granted titles to non-Chinese 
leaders, and although these honorifics weren’t 
absolutely necessary for Asian rulers, the lack of 
one always made their hold on power a little less 
secure. The titles also allowed foreign leaders to 
trade with China. Access to Chinese markets 
wasn’t crucial, since most countries were self-
sufficient in meeting their basic needs, but it 
was important if a country was to have any 
meaningful trade at all. 
Today the United States is at the center of a 
global tianxia. This “American Tianxia” is much 
more than a state or country, or even an empire. 
It pervades all areas of life. In today’s connected 
world, Chinese businesses, Russian universities, 
and even Iranian revolutions are run on 
American lines. The Islamic State (ISIS) 
recommends that its fighters use Android 
devices whereas North Korea’s ruling Kim 
family famously prefers Apple. Many people 
around the world oppose the United States, its 
policies, and its president, but they still want to 
send their children to American universities, 
invest their money in American companies, and 
express their opinions on American social 
networks. 
This is not some kind of consumerism run 
amok. Standing at the center of the global order, 
the United States has, over the last quarter 
century, reoriented the way the world—and 
especially the world’s elite—works, plays, and 
thinks. It has brought them into an international 
hierarchy in which gaining status requires 
succeeding within U.S.-centered networks and 
playing by U.S. rules. And it makes twenty-first 
century America more powerful than any 
empire, kingdom, or commonwealth in history. 
The United States—that is, the country itself—
has plenty of hard and soft power. But the 
United States has limits. The American Tianxia 
does not. 
 
The United States has limits. The 
American Tianxia does not. 
THE CENTRAL STATE 
The name for China in Chinese, “Zhongguo,” 
literally means “middle kingdom,” or, more 
prosaically, central state or states (there is no 
plural inflection in Chinese). “Middle Kingdom” 
is also the name of China in Japanese, Korean, 
Vietnamese, and most other East Asian 
languages. Within the cultural and political 
sphere of East Asia, China was always at the 
center. For example, the Japanese name for 
Japan, Nippon, literally means the “land of the 
rising sun”—as seen from China. The “nam” in 
Vietnam means “south,” indicating its direction 
from the Viet, an ancient people of southern 
China. 
China’s neighbors recognized that China was the 
central state of East Asia and used the Chinese 
word tianxia to describe the system to which 
they belonged. China did not directly rule over 
East Asia as an oppressive imperial overlord, 
nor did it provide system-wide security as a 
regional hegemon. Chinese centrality was 
simply a matter of size and location—China was 
large and all the surrounding countries were 
small. 
 
Tianxia thus referred not to hegemony, but to a 
system in which China was both the dominant 
political and economic power as well as the 
center of the cultural universe, especially for 
elites. China’s neighbors adopted Confucianism; 
in Korea and Japan, elites studied classical 
Chinese, which was long the language of 
government, scholarship, and even literature. 
Chinese diplomatic recognition could turn a 
local warlord into a respected king. China also 
had the economic weight to play “take it or leave 
it” in trade negotiations with its neighbors. 
When China sent armies abroad, it was usually 
to intervene in support of one faction or another 
in its neighboring countries, not to conquer 
them. In fact the founder of the Ming Dynasty, 
the Hongwu Emperor (r. 1368‒1398), left a 
letter of advice to his successors reminiscent of 
George Washington’s warning about “entangling 
alliances”: 
The overseas foreign countries ... are separated 
from us by mountains and seas ... I am 
concerned that future generations might abuse 
China’s wealth and power and covet the 
military glories of the moment to send armies 
into the field [against them] without reason 
and cause a loss of life. May they be sharply 
reminded that this is forbidden. 
 
China’s size, power, prestige, and location meant 
that all of East Asia was subsumed within the 
Chinese tianxia. But when Europeans arrived in 
the sixteenth century, the world suddenly 
seemed a lot bigger. By the end of the Ming 
Dynasty in 1644, China was no longer at the 
center of “everything under the heavens.” It had 
become just another major regional power in a 
much larger world. 
The Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) was, in its first 
two centuries, even more powerful than the 
Ming, but it lacked the moral authority to define 
civilization in the eyes of its neighbors. In this 
period Japan completely closed itself off from 
interaction with China, and Korean rulers only 
accepted Qing suzerainty by force. Whereas 
Ming China aspired to be the font of universal 
wisdom, Qing China was merely the bully next 
door. Later it became the victim next door, as 
China was bludgeoned into signing a series of 
unequal treaties, first by the European powers 
and later by Japan. 
Now China is once again a major regional 
power in a much larger world. China’s neighbors 
have adjusted to the return of China, but few of 
them have reoriented their self-understandings 
around it. Japan and South Korea, wary of 
China’s rise, continue to align their foreign 
policies with that of the United States. Only in 
Southeast Asia is China the dominant player in 
international relations, but even there the 
balance is more against China than in its favor. 
Some Chinese scholars, such as the philosopher 
Zhao Tingyang, have promoted the idea of a 
new, twenty-first century tianxia, by which they 
mean a harmonious global system run on 
Chinese Confucian principles. But if there is a 
central state of the twenty-first century it clearly 
is not China. To be fair, Chinese writers and 
diplomats routinely deny any special status for 
China in their plans. Instead they assert the 
principle of sovereign equality, eschewing any 
special role for China in their prospective 
“harmonious world” (the term used by China’s 
then-President Hu Jintao in his 2005 speech to 
the United Nations). But can there be a 
true tianxia—a harmonious ordering of 
everything under the heavens—without a central 
state to harmonize it? 
A close look at the historical 
Ming tianxia suggests not. Harmony may 
require a certain Confucian forbearance on the 
part of the central state, but it requires a central 
state. Ming-era East Asia wasn’t stable because 
everyone agreed to live peacefully and 
respectfully in a harmonious commonwealth 
with China; it was stable because, practically 
speaking, all international affairs had to be 
conducted with regard to one overwhelmingly 
influential central state, and that central state 
was generally wise enough not to leverage its 
centrality to maximize its own narrow short-
term gains. Compare that to the extreme 
violence of the European interstate system that 
arose in the Renaissance and lasted until World 
War II, in which multiple evenly-matched 
powers slugged it out for dominance. 
Today the United States is the central state—
the zhongguo, so to speak—of the international 
system. Some people say that we now live in a 
multipolar world; that the U.S. share of global 
GDP is in terminal decline; that the dollar’s 
central role in the world economy is under 
threat; that the rest of the world no longer 
respects the United States. These declinists miss 
the point: the United States doesn’t have to rule 
the world in order to harmonize it. In 
a tianxia like Ming East Asia or today’s 
American world, it is not the raw power of the 
central state that stabilizes the system. It is its 
centrality. 
 
 
 
China festival in Brussels, October 2009. 
THE GLOBAL INDIVIDUAL 
If there is one thing that defines the United 
States’ role in the current world system, it is 
centrality. For instance, despite all the supposed 
bad blood between China and Donald Trump, 
the U.S.–Chinese relationship is among the 
bright spots in the new administration’s foreign 
policy. One of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 
major goals for his first summit with Trump, in 
April, was to keep the U.S. financial system open 
to Chinese state-owned banks and 
clearinghouses. He got what he wanted in 
exchange for delivering on Trump’s priorities on 
market access and North Korea. For all 
countries, but especially a major trading nation 
like China, access to the dollar system is crucial. 
The United States’ centrality in the global 
financial system gives it considerable leverage 
over the rest of the world. Indeed U.S. economic 
sanctions, such as those on Iran and Russia, are 
much more effective now than they were at the 
height of American postwar hegemony, during 
the 1950s and 1960s, because globalization has 
increased the interconnectedness of the world 
and that interconnectedness is centered on the 
United States. And it is not just the threads of 
global finance that run through New York and 
California—the vast majority of the world’s 
Internet traffic crosses the United States, too. 
The United States benefits from its centrality in 
other networks as well: academic networks, 
business networks, media networks, you name 
it. It is hard to think of any global network that 
isn’t centered in and on the United States. 
This prominence is not limited to cyberspace, 
however. Foreign universities increasingly offer 
U.S.-style degrees, partner with American (or 
other English-speaking) universities, and even 
seek U.S. accreditation. Elites all over the world 
school their children in English, exposing them 
to American culture and ways of thinking. In the 
world of business, U.S.-style shareholder value 
principles, management styles, and work ethics 
have become global best practices. The top 
organizations in almost every profession are 
disproportionately located in the United States. 
One result of this centrality is that the United 
States is not just the favored destination for the 
world’s money. Perhaps more importantly, it 
has become the favored destination for the 
world’s people. This especially true for the 
Chinese—citizens of the greatest putative rival to 
U.S. power.  More than 300,000 Chinese 
students are now studying in the United States, 
with an annual flow of nearly 100,000 new 
students every year. But the flow of Chinese 
students may soon be overtaken by a new source 
of enduring U.S.–Chinese ties: Chinese anchor 
babies. 
California maternity hospitals catering to 
Chinese mothers try to keep a low profile, but 
everyone agrees that their business is booming. 
Estimates are that anywhere from 10,000 to 
perhaps 100,000 Chinese women give birth in 
the United States every year—and these babies 
are automatically eligible for U.S. citizenship. By 
mid-century there may be 2–3 million elite 
“Chinese,” raised in China, who are in fact 
citizens of the United States and only the United 
States, since China does not allow dual 
citizenship. 
Birth tourism was once difficult because U.S. 
consulates routinely denied visas to pregnant 
women. But all that changed in November 2014 
when the United States and China agreed to 
offer 10-year tourist visas to each other’s 
citizens. Now a Chinese woman can get a visa 
before she gets married, wait until she becomes 
pregnant, then fly to the United States at the 
beginning of her third trimester. This 
dramatically cuts the time, hassle, and expense 
of having a “USA baby.” 
China’s “USA babies,” graduates of American 
universities, and other elites with investments in 
the United States may not even live in the 
country and probably do not think of themselves 
as Americans. But they are inextricably tied into 
U.S.-centered networks of money, power, and 
prestige. Like the Russian oligarchs who left 
Moscow for London a generation ago, they may 
imagine that they and their children will remain 
attached to their native country. In reality, such 
families become global citizens who live in a 
transnational space built in the image of the 
United States—the American Tianxia. 
 
Those who inhabit this American Tianxia—
transnational elites from China and elsewhere—
all share a common connection to the United 
States (or one of its close Anglo–Saxon allies, 
such as the United Kingdom) that results in the 
formation of shared values. Chief among them is 
the very American value of individual self-
fulfillment. Detached from any particular 
country of origin, these elites inevitably adopt 
an individualistic approach to life. The idea that 
“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” are 
inalienable rights is distinctively American, but 
it is no longer uniquely American. These days, 
elites all over the world have learned that it is 
right, even moral, to prioritize their own 
happiness over traditional national and religious 
attachments. 
This individual focus on personal self-
fulfillment, combined with the centrality of the 
United States in nearly all global distinction 
hierarchies—the academic, artistic, business, 
financial, and technological rankings by which 
we judge ourselves and the people around us)—
has created a world in which individual elites 
owe their status as much to the United States as 
to their home countries. A banker in Hong 
Kong, for instance, may have landed their job 
thanks to a degree from Harvard. The ultimate 
power that the United States derives from its 
centrality in the American Tianxia is thus 
network power, or the ability to get what you 
want by shaping the life opportunities that are 
available to others. Transnational elites must 
operate within a global network based on the 
United States and respond to its incentives. As a 
result, they don’t want to bring down the U.S.-
centered global system and its U.S.-centered 
value chains, educational hierarchies, and 
Internet. Their greatest fear is that the system 
will be undermined by others: Russian hackers, 
Muslim fundamentalists, or even a U.S. 
president. 
 
THE NEXT AMERICAN CENTURY 
The American publisher Henry Luce is well-
remembered for predicting, in 1941, that the 
twentieth century was the “American Century.” 
Less well-remembered is his assertion that the 
twentieth century would be “America’s first 
century as a dominant power in the world,” 
which strongly implied that it would not be the 
last. 
These days American boosterism has fallen out 
of favor. Declinism is in, and contemporary 
accounts of U.S. decline inevitably hinge on the 
challenge from China. Forecasts of future 
Chinese economic power routinely assume that 
China will simultaneously continue to grow in 
per capita terms while remaining a country that 
is four times the population of the United States. 
Most people now acknowledge that China's 
economic growth is slowing, and there are grave 
doubts about its future trajectory. But multiply 
any growth at all by 1.3 billion people, and the 
figures are still impressive. 
Yet the Chinese population is set to begin 
declining by mid-century, while the five English-
speaking countries at the core of the American 
Tianxia (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States), will 
continue to grow, thanks to healthy rates of 
fertility and immigration. There are too many 
uncertainties involved for demographic 
predictions on such a long time scale to be taken 
at face value, although the exercise is suggestive. 
But if the American Tianxia thesis is correct, 
demographic competition is almost beside the 
point. Increasing numbers of Chinese people 
will identify with the maintenance of the global 
order represented by the American Tianxia. 
Today’s Pax Americana is not rooted in the 
military strength of the United States; as Syria 
and Ukraine demonstrate, the United States has 
little interest in ending the wars of others. The 
true stabilizers that underlie the Pax 
Americana are the global networks of the 
American Tianxia. As a result of the openness of 
these networks, the most effective way for 
Chinese families to increase their power and 
wealth is not for them to lead China into 
successful foreign wars. A much better strategy 
is just to move to the United States. 
By transferring status competition from the 
country level to the individual level, the 
American Tianxia has neutered the nation-state. 
Countries are still very important as units of 
local administration, as are provinces, cities, 
and districts. But national states are no longer 
the main actors on the historical stage. States 
still do a lot, but they no longer make history as 
we have known it in the West—history as the 
constant vying of politically organized human 
communities for power and prestige. 
When “everything under the heavens” is unified 
in a single hierarchical system, people are more 
concerned with climbing up the hierarchy than 
with bringing down the sky. That makes the 
American Tianxia more stable than any system 
the world has ever known, including the 
old tianxia of Ming China. It may not always be 
fair, but it is harmonious, and it is here to stay.  
